This paper explores the challenges for analysis of urbanization which can arise from insufficiently rigorous definition of what is 'urban'. Policy makers and investors still use the ideas of 'rural' versus 'urban' and increasingly assume that the pace of urbanization in African countries is a measure of positive economic structural change.
INTRODUCTION
It has long been acknowledged by urban researchers that international comparisons of rates and levels of urbanization can be misleading because of the significant (Shen 2005; Montgomery 2008; Qin and Zhang 2014) , and that the frequently cited case of India's exacting criteria for a settlement to be deemed 'urban' mean it is recorded as far less urbanized than it would be under most other countries' criteria (Satterthwaite 2007; Jones and Corbridge 2010 ; Indian Institute for Human Settlements 2011). As the world becomes more urban, these issues have attracted more attention, perhaps because of the iconic significance of anticipating, and then passing, the 'moment' when the global population shifted from being mainly 'rural' to mainly 'urban'. Identifying regions and countries in Asia and Africa where this has occurred, or is projected in the near future to occur, is a common starting point for contemporary economic analyses by a wide range of actors, including investment consultancies, financial and current affairs media, development agencies, national and city governments, NGOs as well as academics (Potts 2016) . On the other hand, many of these economic analyses brush over the difficulties of definitions, if they recognize them at all.
The characteristics used to define what is 'urban' include settlements' political and administrative functions, population size and population density, economic characteristics (in particular the nature of employment), or some combination of these. These features can all be traced back, conceptually, to the transformations for human organization and production made possible by the emergence of agriculture around twelve thousand years ago. Food surpluses allowed the specialization of labour away from acquiring food, which in turn facilitated the development of trade, the accumulation of surpluses, complex and hierarchical types of state formation, and class divisions. These new types of occupations, trade and political and religious authority were all located in and channelled through the new nodes in the human landscape which emerged: relatively large, permanent, densely settled and heterogeneous (cf Wirth 1969) urban places. Thus, from the very beginning, labour specialization away from natural resource-based work (eg agriculture, forestry, fishing) was the crucial enabler and characteristic of urban settlements.
The influence of urbanism's historical roots can still be seen in some national definitions of 'urban' used today which are published in the United Nation's World Urbanization Prospects (WUP), the main global urban dataset. This provides numbers on total urban populations as provided by national statistical authorities based on country definitions. Administrative criteria are still the most common and are used by 'just over half' the countries reporting to the UN (Montgomery et al 2004: 132) . Density and size are frequently used to determine the cut-off between urban settlements and rural areas and settlements. However, only 30 countries reported in the most recent 2014 WUP (United Nations 2015) included economic characteristics, despite their significance in the emergence of urbanism. Of these thirteen were Republics within the former USSR which still use its definition based on number of inhabitants and a 'predominance of non-agricultural workers and their families'. In Japan one criterion is that '60 per cent or more of the population (including their dependents) are engaged in manufacturing, trade or other urban type of business ', and in India that '75 per cent of male working population are engaged in non-agricultural pursuits'. Until 1982 settlements with less than 100,000 in China were only 'urban' if more than 70 per cent or their populations were 'registered as nonagricultural'. In these countries, where large 'villages' or very dense rural settlement patterns have long histories, the centrality of 'urban' being associated with non-agricultural types of work is evident. It relates to an understanding that 'urban' means more than settlement size and/or density, and must also mean 'not rural' in economic terms.
This latter point is significant in relation to the complex and often contradictory realms of interpreting national urban data. One reason why cross-national comparisons of urbanization can be misleading is that urban population thresholds may be so low in some countries that settlements which are essentially villages with very high proportions of agriculturally-based livelihoods are included. They can also be too high so that settlements where most households do not derive any significant part of their livelihoods from natural resource-based activities, which might logically be regarded as 'urban', are excluded. Population density criteria are also fraught with possible difficulties since rural settlement patterns are very variable between and within countries and over time. Factors involved include local agro-ecological conditions: fertile soils and reasonable rainfall (or irrigation) may allow for very high rural densities where smallholder agriculture is still the norm as it still is in many parts of Asia and Africa. These may equal or exceed the density required under European Union criteria for classification as an 'urban cluster' of 'at least 300 inhabitants per km 2 and a minimum population of 5,000' (Dijkstra and Poelman, 2014: 6) which translates into 3 people per hectare over a contiguous area of 17 square kilometres.
1 Montgomery et al (2004: 135) note that problems with cross-national comparisons of the level and pace of urbanization are often related to these issues of defining 'settlements that might be classified as either rural or urban' although 'one can skirt the problem by focusing on the urban population that resides in settlements above a given size'. This is often true, but problems with defining the 'urban' population of larger settlements can still affect the measurement of urbanization levels. Urban boundaries can be cast too wide, including people who are still farmers. Major changes can also occur without these being noted in census or other reports. On the other hand, they may not be expanded often enough as urban populations grow and residential areas spread beyond existing boundaries, thus excluding many who are functionally part of the city in terms of the derivation of their livelihoods. For very large cities, such as Sao Paulo or Cairo, there are further complexities for tracking their physical and population growth depending on whether the city's administrative boundaries are used, or the broader concepts of the urban agglomeration, or metropolitan area. These different concepts can yield very different growth rates (Montgomery et al 2004) .
Clearly, therefore, defining what is 'urban' is complicated and contested and there is much scope for misdirected analysis of trends both within and between countries.
The view taken here is that 'urban' is best understood as a multi-faceted concept. It involves settlement form (size, density), settlement function (as nodes in nested landscapes of urban hierarchies which channel local, national and global flows of political power, trade and finance), production (with manufacturing industry of particular significance for contemporary cities) and employment. Particularly if urban trends are being factored into broader analyses of national economic change, urban employment and economic activities need to be characterised by labour specialisation in ways that mainly sets them aside from work in the primary sector, based on natural resources. In broad terms, secondary and tertiary sector activities (whether formal or informal) are characteristic of urban places (albeit they can also be found in rural settlements eg shopkeepers, teachers, health workers).
The most obvious primary sector occupation regarded as 'non-urban' is farming (whether on large-or small-scale farms), as evidenced by urban definitions which specify that 'urban' employment must be non-agricultural. Working in forestry or fishing are other primary sector occupations which would be considered as non-urban.
As with all such discussions, there are always caveats; for example, a large fishing port from which industrial trawlers operate would be an urban settlement, but a settlement where most fishing is on a small-scale artisanal basis might not. where all places and people are bound into a nexus of urban influences and forces which are now so determinant that the concept of 'rural' has become meaningless (Brenner 2013) . Indeed, even the word is set to one aside, in favour of the term 'nonurban realm' (Brenner and Schmid 2014) , a realm which is seen as theoretically redundant. This is clearly a more dramatic shift away from conventional ideas about human settlement patterns. For reasons of space it is not possible to engage properly with this debate here: that is a different project. Obviously a paper such as this about urban and rural definitions is rendered pointless were this view accepted, which it is not. For this paper it is worth saying, however, that it is a viewpoint which perhaps seems more feasible to Eurocentric than, say, to Africanist urban scholars, let alone those working on rural Africa. The approach has obvious parallels with broader ideas about globalization, but the idea that all places are increasingly interconnected and affected by events and market forces in distant places does not have to be seen as an essentially urban phenomenon (or indeed necessarily a 21 st century phenomenon).
Given the problems with defining what is 'urban', the new ideas about a definitional shift towards a spectrum approach to the 'rural' and the 'urban', and the view that perhaps everywhere now is 'urban', the question arises of whether we should do away with these labels and stop trying to define what makes settlements 'urban'? The view taken here is that academic practitioners in urban and development studies cannot
abandon them yet. While in some arenas it may make good sense to embrace a spectrum approach, it has to be clear that those are the terms of reference and it does not mean it is useful in all situations. Furthermore, we have to recognize that most of those beyond social science academic circles do still work with the general labels of rural and urban, and this includes governments, ministries, statistical offices, all the development agencies and policy makers generally. So also do economists, and many other disciplines involved in development fields, and so do private sector Because the data that are out there, listed under the terms rural or urban, are given significant weight by many decision makers.
There are other sources of misleading urban data in Africa: infrequent or poorly conducted censuses, for instance. These can also lead to the use of inaccurate and outdated projections. These have been analysed elsewhere (Potts 2012a) . The focus of this paper is different. Even if censuses are regularly published and reasonably accurate in their enumeration, the evaluation of urban trends still needs to check for anomalies arising from the sorts of definitional issues discussed above. The remainder of this paper focuses on the possible impacts of these definitional issues with reference to sub-Saharan Africa and Kenya in particular. A particular concern is the ways in which the 'numbers' recorded under the labels 'rural' and 'urban' are often understood and used as economic proxies (see Potts 2016) . After a short section outlining the key ways African countries define what is urban and the analytical problems these can cause, these issues are illustrated by a detailed discussion of the example of Kenya where there have been problems with published urban data relating to urban definitions and also some significant differences in the urban data provided by different sources due to different definitions. It is shown that this can lead to very different understandings of what is actually happening on the ground, and that some of these interpretations can be misleading for policy makers trying to use the data to deduce trends in economic change in either rural or urban areas.
AFRICAN URBAN DEFINITIONS
Few African countries include any occupational criteria in their definition of urban settlements. Of the mainland sub-Saharan African countries, 23 use a size threshold only or mainly, sometimes with some administrative centres also included (see Table   1 ). The population needed to be an urban centre can be less than 2,000 as in Somalia or Guinea-Bissau, and eight countries use 2,000 as the threshold. As already noted, Nigeria uses 20,000. Were this to be reduced to, say, 5,000, and were there to be a census there which gave us reasonably reliable urban data, given the size of Nigeria's population, this would undoubtedly suddenly increase the urban share of West Africa's population, and indeed the whole of sub-Saharan Africa's. Table 2 Density is also sometimes factored into the mix of urban definitions but, leaving aside South Africa which has a swathe of logical urban criteria, there are only six subSaharan African mainland countries (ie excluding island states like Mauritius) which include economic or occupational characteristics (see Table 2 ). This includes the DRC, which has by far the largest population of this group, but as it has not had a census since 1984 it is only possible to guess at its urban trends since then. For the others, since occupational data for individual towns (besides the largest sometimes)
are not published by statistical offices, it is hard to verify how rigorously these definitional criteria are applied and the UN have to take the data on trust. 
CONFUSING AND COLLIDING DEFINITIONS: THE CASE OF KENYA
The paper now turns to discussing Kenya, a country which illustrates almost every possible complication with urban definitions discussed in the earlier sections of this paper: a very low threshold of 2,000 people; sudden and unexplained changes in definitions and urban boundaries between censuses; and the evident inclusion of millions of rural people as 'urban'. It also exhibits another, almost existential, 'urban' definitional issue where even some large settlements turn out to have significant numbers of primary sector workers, indicating a lack of labour specialisation even at the top end of the urban hierarchy. Furthermore, Africapolis, The implementation of growth centre policy in Kenya has faced many obstacles.
….. Lack of appropriate data on the urban centres and the hinterlands makes it impossible to develop effective selection criteria. Further, haphazard change of boundaries of urban centres makes it difficult to establish a stable database. This has seen huge parts of the countryside included in the urban boundary that seriously exaggerate the sizes of centres. (Mireri 2007: 112-113) Table 4 , the core urban population of the town itself was only about 36,000; the majority enumerated were 'peri-urban'. Simple observation of the area around the small town via google maps shows nothing that would characterise the settlements and landuse there as anything but rural (see images of Vihiga town and immediately adjacent rural landscape in interactive map).
Interactive google map link about here Images 1 and 2 in powerpoint file
Once this is established, very different economic interpretations are possible. One could be that the area experienced out-migration that was partly rural-urban in character (i.e. rural people were leaving Vihiga for other, truly urban, localities).
Another could be that there had been out-migration of a rural-rural character driven by land shortage -this seems to be a strong likelihood as the population density is high. Thus there are three different scenarios which depend on interpretations of urban definitions: out-migration from a town; out-migration from rural to urban areas beyond the area defined as Vihiga urban centre; or rural-rural migration to land outside of the area. The implications of each scenario for analyses of migration and urbanisation and Kenyan economic change are evidently entirely different.
The example of Kehancha, which lists as Kenya's sixth largest 'urban center' if the aggregated total figures were taken at face value (see Table 4 suggesting very significant net out-migration. Using the core urban populations for both years, however, the rate was 3.8%, suggesting more plausibly some net inmigration, and that it was growing as fast as Nairobi and a little faster than Mombasa.
An example of a much larger Kenyan town with definitional issues relating both to over-expanded boundaries and occupational characteristics is Nakuru, with over While there is some overlap in the definitional imprecision between the Kenyan census data and Africapolis, the latter's approach is more problematic. Figure 3 shows sub-locations in the Western Region of Kenya defined as urban by the census; a comparison between these areas and the broader brush depiction of most of the region as 'urban' by Africapolis in Figure 4 illustrates the difference. 
Rural versus urban settlement patterns?
It is argued that using these Africapolis figures for anything other than a starting point for a discussion about Kenya's unusually dense but scattered rural settlement patterns would be bound to mislead. The graphics in the Africapolis report are labelled with the terms 'urbanization'/'urban' and do not clarify that there is a departure into measuring a more esoteric spectrum of settlement patterns. As noted in the introduction, there is utility in spectrum approaches to the study of urbanization but they need to be cross-referenced with livelihood patterns if they are to contribute to debates about socio-economic change. In relation to this, the Africapolis report on Central and East Africa does say: 'the configurations of the agglomerated areas with densified space are essentially agricultural areas, particularly in Kenya, Cameroon, Sudan. Unlike villages and towns based on people working in services, administration and industry, the processes in East and Central Africa often involve the fragmentation of peasant farms' and with reference to western Kenya that, 'In [these] societies which maintain norms of scattered settlement, agricultural practices are generating in-situ uncontrolled agglomeration processes …. one finds a hybrid form of settlement, where agriculture is the main activity, but where the density is too high to be rural but too small for a town of this size. We are therefore dealing with conurbations…' ii (Harre et al 2010a: 15) .
Although this does alert the reader to the rural nature of many of the landscapes labelled 'urban', nonetheless some terms are being used in ways very different to how However, because the Africapolis report has defined so many densely settled rural areas as urban, even when they were very far from the observable boundaries of builtup areas of real towns, subsequent out-migration from such areas into towns and cities becomes 'hidden'. This is because migration flows are only measured across the administrative or settlement boundaries used by censuses or other surveys. Any movement within a defined spatial unit, such as an urban settlement, will not be picked up by migration questions in such surveys. Very extended urban boundaries which embrace large rural areas with strongly agricultural populations mean that mobility within that spatial unit with important policy and economic implicationsthat is migration between functionally rural and functionally urban areas -is missed.
As demonstrated in this paper this is already occurring due to the current Kenyan census approach. The same issues arise with Africapolis, but further exaggerated.
Africapolis projects that over the current decade, 2010 to 2020, Kenya's urbanization level will rise by less than one percentage point to 46.2%. This would imply that net migration between rural and urban Kenya had severely contracted with all that this would imply in terms of very slow changes in national employment and production structures. Although such slow urbanization in African countries is not unprecedented (Potts 2012a) , it seems rather unlikely in Kenya's case. Yet the next census will probably not be able to provide clear answers about these useful planning indices either because of the national definitional issues. The problem is that, whatever is actually occurring in terms of net migration flows and urban trends within
Kenya is becoming increasingly difficult to measure and analyse because so many rural people have now been conflated into the 'urban' population.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has argued that analysis of urban trends requires careful consideration of the definitions and labels relating to 'urban' and 'rural' employed by the datasets used. It is widely recognized that comparative analysis of urbanization needs to be wary of differences in national definitions. If this is addressed, often it is achieved by using standardized urban population thresholds (eg 10,000 or 20,000). However, as has been shown in the case study of Kenya, there are other potential sources of confusion. These can make analysing urban trends within the same country, let alone comparisons, very challenging. Changes in definitions between censuses can render analysis meaningless. Questionable treatments of in-situ urbanization can also mislead.
It is important to note that it is recognized that in-situ urbanization, whereby settlements previously defined as rural are re-defined as urban without necessarily However, relabelling as 'in-situ urbanization' landscapes and populations which are functionally rural, where natural resource based landuses and livelihoods predominate, on the basis of population density alone is problematic. It makes the assessment of the geography of structural economic change extremely difficult. This paper has shown how this is one process that has made the analysis of urbanization in Kenya for some decades both confused and confusing. First, Kenyan censuses ascribe significant numbers of rural people to many 'urban' settlements . Second, the Africapolis report on Kenyan urbanization takes this process even further and redefines millions more rural Kenyans as 'urban', making specific reference to the term 'in situ urbanization' in a way which, as explained, is regarded as highly questionable.
Promoting the use of logical urban definitions which users of urban data understand and recognize is not an essentialist argument. It is not a call for the development of one set of universally accepted urban criteria. Not only is that unachievable, given the vast range of national definitions in use, but it would undoubtedly cause another set of problems since there really are important localized factors and contexts which determine what is sensibly definable as 'urban'. Instead the analysis in this paper is pointing to two issues with implications for urban and economic policies. One is that statisticians -those who 'make' the urban (or rural) data -can improve things for end users if they explain as clearly as possible how and why 'urban' settlements and populations are defined and, crucially, what the definitions mean for how the data can be used and what can and cannot be deduced from it. For example, if density criteria alone are used to define some areas, as in Kenya, then users might be reminded that this may not mean that there have been any structural economic changes in those areas which conform with the norms of urbanization as an economic process. The second issue is that users of the statistics need to check that the 'numbers' conform to their expectations of what 'urban'implies. For a political scientist, for example, common political rationales for the expansion of urban boundaries to 'capture' new voters or increase the population weight of the urban unit for allocations of national resources may be precisely the objects of study. However, for an economic geographer or investment planner there may be an expectation that the data indicate something about economies and employment structures. Ideally other data on, for example, infrastructure and services in individual settlements would be factored in to urban definitions or available for users to cross-reference with population numbers.
There are strong limitations imposed, however, on African national statistical offices by their limited resources (Jerven 2013) and, beyond population numbers, publicly available socio-economic data on individual towns, apart sometimes from the capital city and one or two others, are not easily found. Some data for 'all urban' areas are sometimes published but these are of little guidance for intra-urban assessments.
Nonetheless most African censuses do collect data on a range of household characteristics such as housing type and education which are often published for provincial and district level. If these were disaggregated by individual urban settlement also, our understandings of urbanization would be much improved. The same is true of labour force surveys which are beginning to be more regularly collected in a few countries, such as Ghana, but again the data are not disaggregated by individual towns. However, even if 'economic' users find that 'urban' and 'rural' definitions do not, for example, account for 'what people do'so that associated datasets may be problematic for assessing economic structural change, as in Kenya, then at least they are aware that the data should be used with caution. This might also
